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Derivatives are not inherently toxic. One senior Wall Streeter compares
them to fertilizer: It can help your garden grow or can be made into bombs.'
It all started so simply. Consumers needed access to loans to purchase
a home and weave themselves into the American Dream. Lenders were
constrained when capital was tied up in long term mortgages. The
Government saw the opportunity to alleviate both problems by buying
and bundling the home mortgages and using them as collateral (along
with an implicit guarantee) for publicly traded investments on the
secondary market. But, it became so complex. The market whirled out of
* David B. Ford Professor of Real Estate, Wharton School Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. This article benefitted greatly from research funding from Zell Lurie Real Estate
Center. I also acknowledge the research assistance ofJennifer Panichelli Barzeski, Andrew Hohns and Erik
Vog and very helpful comments on previous drafts from Jonathan Shils, Peter Linneman and Joe Gyourko.
I Mara Der Hovanesian et al., Taking Risk to Extremes: Will Derivatives Cause a Major Blowup in
the World's Credit Markets?, Bus. WK., May 23, 2005, available at
http//www.businessweek.comi/magazine/content/05_2/b3934099_mzO2O.htm.
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control as investments and derivatives became more and more distant
from the ultimate source of repayment-the underlying mortgages. The
policy of imposing the government into capital markets has a profound
effect because it not only prompts consumer behavior, but also, controls
access to capital in the housing finance arena. Add lax regulation,
mismatched incentives and outright greed into the brew and the result is
total market failure as we have recently endured.
The primary mortgage market is a credit market. Etymologically
"credit" means "to trust, entrust, believe." Lenders trusted the borrowers
to pay and based the assessed risk (and price) on this basis. Taking this
notion up one step into the secondary market, investors view risk (and
price) through the lens of the likelihood of borrowers repaying their
mortgages in a timely fashion. In some securitizations, governmental
backing enhances the deal by interjecting an implicit governmental
guarantee of repayment into the Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
("RMBS") market. This guarantee serves not only to placate investors
but also to insure that funds are available for mortgage based lending. In
this fashion it fuses the twin desires of first lubricating the capital markets
and second insuring the flow of funds to prospective home purchasers.
From this fusion an entire secondary market in structured mortgage
finance has grown to dominate the residential mortgage lending market.5
However, over time the derivative6 financial ornaments hung on the
2 DOUGLAS HARPER, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY (2001),
http://www.etymonline.con/index-php?term=credit. Cf Joseph Philip Forte, Disruption in the Capital
Markets: What Happened?, PROB. & PROP. Sept/Oct. 2008, at 8, 13 (discussing positive and negative
effects of globalization and securitization on economy).
3 See Richard Scott Carnell, Handling die Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enerprise, 80 WASH. L
REV. 565, 570 (2005) (explaining that the government "implicitly backs" government sponsored enterprises
("GSEs")).
In 1992, Congress passed the Federal Housing Enterprises Safety and Soundness Act which
amended the statutory charters of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and established several broad public policy
purposes for the two GSEs. Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. SS
4501-4642 (2009). Specifically, the charters authorize the GSEs to provide stability in the secondary mortgage
market, increase the liquidity of mortgage investments, improve the spatial distribution of investment capital
available for residential mortgage financing, and provide assistance to residential mortgages on housing for
low- and moderate-income families. Id. S5 4561-4569.
s See Jesse M. Keenan, America's Trillion-Dollar Housing Mistake: The Political Economy of
Housing, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv. L. 107, 108 (2007) ("Today's markets
benefit from outside capital by way of an increasingly sophisticated secondary market.").
6 A derivative is any kind of financial instrument whose value is based on the value of another
financial instrument. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT33 (12th ed. 2009).
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RMBS offerings have become more and more sophisticated, less
understandable and less subject to easy regulation.7 The residential
mortgage market at one time benefitted greatly from the infusion of
capital supplied by an increasingly sophisticated secondary (and tertiary)
market.8 In the course of recent events, though, this array of ancillary
products has eroded both trust and belief in the fundamental mortgage
market.9
Inherent in this discussion are the policy decisions of a deregulated
financial system running alongside of the push toward expansion of
homeownership. Standing alone both policies may have some intrinsic
qualities. However, when pursued together they ignited the worst
financial crisis in decades. As we begin to sort through the financial
corpses littering the structured finance landscape it would be naYve to
assume that whole loan lending will be the sole survivor. Alternatives to
securitizing home mortgages must recognize both the need for consumer
protection and investor yield appetite. Aiming most regulatory efforts
solely at the primary lending market falls short. Regulation and oversight
is needed more urgently in presiding over the derivative investment
vehicles that interact with primary lending markets.
The goal of this comment rests with an analysis of the role of three
investment vehicles in particular-Asset Backed Commercial Paper
("ABCP"), Collateralized Debt Obligations ("CDOs") and Credit Default
Swaps ("CDS")-in transforming a somewhat stodgy market segment
into the financial equivalent of the lawless wild west of buy first, ask
questions later. Though different in their structure and investment
horizon, all of these derivative products have the similarity of promoting
investing severed from understanding the underlying risk. Real estate risk
was masked by painting over a layer of fixed income structured finance.
However, just as a top layer of paint does not cover without primer, the
layer of structured finance was applied without the primer of mutual
understanding between real estate market and the bond market. As the
real estate risk bubbled through, the derivative structures peeled off and
the market spiraled into disarray. The essential question is this: should
7 See Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253,
254 (2009) (discussing how "new and complex" financial instruments surround the "relatively old and
simple" cause of the financial crisis - hidden leverage).
8 For a fuller discussion of the secondary market for residential mortgage backed securities, see
Keenan, supra note 5, at 108.
9 See generally Steven L Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L J. 193 (2008). The clearest example of
this erosion of trust is the abusive lending practices that facilitated the underwriting of predatory loans. Id
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something as fundamental as home finance be the financial playground
for esoteric investments? To state the problem another way: is housing
policy so important as to cordon off this financial market to all but the
safest investment vehicles?
First, the evolution of the RMBS market will be sketched out. Next,
the impact of the ABCP, the CDO, and the CDS markets will be
explained. These investment vehicles worked within - or perhaps along
side of - a regulatory environment that failed to capture the risk. I will
highlight some holes in the fabric that facilitated market meltdown. This
will lead into a broader analysis of policy, regulation and legislation with
conclusions and recommendations.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RMBS MARKET
The securitization of mortgages involves the structuring of
transactions with a particular goal in mind. Most often that goal is to
create a security with a specific credit rating sufficient to satisfy the
guiding principles of the various credit rating agencies."o Instruments
with a higher rating, of AAA, for example, may be more appealing to
investors. To that end, issuers (alter egos of investment banks) can,
through a careful consideration of risks and a balancing of "pooling and
tranching," create securities with their target rating." Drawing from a
larger loan base allows issuers of securities to work with a more varied and
larger pool of loans, which, in turn, allows for a higher percentage of the
pool that can be sliced into more desirable credit ratings.12
With that said, the vast RMBS market did not suddenly appear on the
financial horizon. Rather, its emergence was a series of shifts and steps
that eventually led to the market as we know it today. The following part
provides a brief overview of the key players in the development of the
secondary mortgage market.
10 See Joshua D. Coval et al. The Economia of Saudured Finance 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper
No. 094)60,2008).
" Id. at 6.
12 Id. at 7 ("[U]sing a larger number of securities in the underlying pool, a progressively larger
fraction of the issued tranches can end up with higher credit ratings than the average rating of the underlying
pool of assets.").
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A. Brief History of the RMBS Market
The movement towards securitization began with the sale by
mortgage lenders of loans they had originated. 3 Eventually, multiple
residential (and later, commercial) mortgage loans were "pooled" or
grouped together and sold as securitized instruments, ultimately growing
into the type of securitization that we know today.14  These securitized
instruments evolved into residential mortgage backed securities. RMBS
are securities whose funds are generated from a pool of mortgage loans.15
Ironically, as the market in recent days has nearly stood at a standstill,
the RMBS market has its origins in another slow time for the market-
the economic depression of the 1930s. In an effort to jumpstart the
economy and revitalize the residential mortgage loan marketplace,
Congress formed several quasi-governmental entities in addition to
instating various incentive programs.' 6  The first government-backed
initiative was the formation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System (the
"FHLBS") in 1932.'1 The FHLBS consists of twelve regional wholesale
banks which provide liquidity in the form of advances to an extensive
network of financial institutions across the country. 8
The next entity, created in 1934, was the Federal Housing
Administration ("FHA"), which helps match buyers with lenders who can
provide appropriate funding.19 In addition, the FHA also provides private
mortgage loan insurance. 20  The Veterans Administration ("VA"), came
into being after the FIA in 1944 and provides similar mortgage insurance
13 See Andrew R Berman, "Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage" - The Use (and Misuse of Metranine
Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L Bus. & FIN. 76, 91 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Once a
Morgage].
14 Id. at 77. See generally CHARLES AUSTIN STONE & ANNE Zissu, THE SECURITIZATION
MARKETS HANDBOOK. STRUCTURES AND DYNAMICS OF MORTGAGE - AND ASSET-BACKED SEcURrIES
(1st ed. 2005) (provides overview of secuntization process from issuance to investment of financial
instrument).
1s For a definition of RMBS, see U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed
Securities (June 25,2007), httpV/www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm.
16 ADAM A. ASHCRAFT ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORTS NO. 357, THE
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM: THE LENDER OF NEXT-TO-LAST RESORT 10 (2008). See also
Berman, Once a Mortgage, supra note 13, at 91; Alan Kronovet, An Overview of Commercial Mortgage
Backed Securitization: The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288, 291-92 (1997).
17 Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L No. 72-304, S 3,47 Stat 725-741 (1932).
1 ASHCRAFT ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-3.
19 National Housing Act, Pub. L No. 73-479, 5 1, 48 Stat 1246 (1934).
2 Berman, Once a Morgage, supra note 13, at 91. See generally FHA, httpV/www.fha.com (last visited
Jan. 4,2010) (providing more detailed information on the FHA).
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coverage to veterans. 2' The insurance programs offered by FHA and VA
alongside the favorable lending terms they promote have helped to bring
fundamental changes to the mortgage industry.2 Together, they allow for
greater accessibility to mortgage funding, which in turn leads to
widespread homeownership, benefiting both lenders and individuals. 2
The third government initiative was the creation of several
Government Sponsored Entities ("GSEs"). A GSE is usually created to
fill a gap when the private factor fails to provide important services. 24 A
GSE is a "federally chartered, privately owned, privately managed financial
institution" which has special lending, guarantee powers and is viewed by
investors to be "implicitly backed" by the U.S. government.25  This
implicit guarantee enables a GSE to borrow at lower interest rates and
operate with higher leverage than similar private sector firms.26 Without
such implicit guarantee, the average GSE would be smaller and less
leveraged and, since it is not linked, pose less danger to the U.S. financial
system. 27
In the early 1930s, credit availability and loan terms varied drastically
across the nation.28 In 1938, the Federal National Mortgage Association
("Fannie Mae") was created for the purpose of helping individuals with
marginal credit obtain mortgages by increasing available capital and
boosting market liquidity. 29 Fannie Mae increased the availability of
mortgages by purchasing mortgages from lenders backed by the FHA.
Fannie Mae's stated mission "is to provide liquidity and stability to the
U.S. housing and mortgage markets,"3 1 with a focus on helping
individuals with marginal credit obtain mortgage financing by creating a
21 Kronovet, supra note 16, at 291.
22 See id.
23 Id.
24 See A. Michael Froornkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. lu.. L REV. 543, 555-56
(1995).
2 Carnell, supra note 3, at 570.
2 Id. at 571-72.
V Id. at 572.
28 Richard Mize, Meet Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac in the Recovery Room, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 2,
2008, at 2B.
2 Randall Dodd, Subprime: Tentacles ofa Crisis, 44 FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT 16 (2007).
3 See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae: Our Charter,
httpV/www.fanniemae.com/aboutfrm/charter.jhtrnl?p=About+Fannie+Mae (last visited Mar. 30,
2010).
31 See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http//www.fnniemae.com/abou/index.htrn (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010). See also Bennan, Once a Morgage, supra note 13, at 91.
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venue for the purchase of FHA loans.3 2 By providing a conduit for the
sale of FHA loans, Fannie Mae gives lenders the added confidence they
may need to provide more funding.
In 1968, Congress divided Fannie Mae into two distinct entities. One
of these entities was "Ginnie Mae," the Government National Mortgage
Association, an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD").33  Ginnie Mae focuses primarily on providing
"affordable housing" to low and moderate income households by allowing
"mortgage lenders to obtain a better price for their mortgage loans in the
secondary market."3 4  Ginnie Mae accomplishes this by guaranteeing
investors "the timely payment of principal and interest on MBS backed by
federally insured or guaranteed loans."3 s The second entity became a
private corporation under the same name, Fannie Mae, with the same
goals as the original agency.3 6
A shortage in capital in the housing market pushed the Government
even more into the securitization market.37  In 1971, "Freddie Mac," the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, was created for the purpose
of purchasing government backed mortgages and conventional loans.3 8
Freddie Mac has been active in the current financial crisis, particularly in
buying "jumbo loans" in an effort to create more liquidity in the market
and to keep mortgage rates affordable.39
These GSEs were instrumental in developing the residential securities
market during the formative years of the 1970-1980s through the issuance
of various certificates and programs.4 Ginnie Mae was the first to offer
32 Kronovet, supra note 16, at 291.
33 Id.
3 For more information about Ginnie Mae, see Ginnie Mae, About Ginnie Mae,
www.ginniemae.gov (last visitedJan. 3,2010).
s Id.
36 Kronovet, supra note 16, at 291.
3 David J. Matthews, Ruined In A Conventional Way: Responses To Credit Ratings' Role In Credit
Crises, 29 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 245, 249 (2009).
38 See Freddie Mac, About Freddie Mac, Our Business,
httpV/www.freddiemac.corn/corporate/companyprofile/our-business/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
One of Freddie Mac's stated objectives on its website is "to provide a continuous and low-cost source
of credit to finance America's housing." Freddie Mac, Investment & Capital Markets Intern,
httpV//www.freddiemac.com/careers/pdf/intern investmentscapitalmarkets.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2010); see also Kronovet, supra note 16, at 292.
39 For more information about Freddie Mac's vital role in the mortgage market, see Frequently
Asked Questions - Freddie Mac, httpVAvww.freddiemac.com/avoidforeclosure/faq.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2010).
4 Cf John C. Cody, The Dysfinctional "Family Resemblance" Test- After Reves v. Ernst & Young, Wien
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publicly traded RMBS in 1970 in the form of pass through certificates
backed by FHA and VA insured mortgages. 4' Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac followed close behind. These entities continue to encourage
homeownership today. Along with private sector securitizations by the
mid 1990s, over 60% of home loans were securitized.42 GSEs remain key
players in the RMBS market, more than a quarter century after their
inception. Indeed, without the GSEs and the implicit-now explicit-
guarantee of the securities issued into the RMBS market residential
lending and the resultant economic landscape would look starkly
different.
B. The Ins and Outs of Securitization -A Brief Explanation of What it is
and How it Works
As described above, RMBS evolved over the later decades of the
twentieth century, bringing many beneficial changes to the industry.
Investment banks (often in concert with rating agencies) use a two-step
process of "pooling and tranching" to manufacture RMBS with the
desired level of investment risk.43 In the first step, a group of loans, or
assets, with varying credit risks are pooled together and packaged into a
mortgage backed security." The security instrument is then sliced and
divided into a hierarchical structure with different tranches, or classes.4 s
The junior tranches are the last paid and, therefore, are the most
subordinate and are the first to suffer losses, while the senior tranches
only absorb losses once the junior tranches have been used up." In this
way, the senior tranches, or claims, are able to achieve higher credit
ratings than the more junior claims. The higher the tranche, the lower
the yield on the investment while the lower the tranche, the higher the
yield.47
are Mortgage Notes "Securitie"?, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 761, 767 (1994) (for a review of the formation of government
sponsored agencies, like Fannie Mae).
41 See Kronovet, supra note 16, at 292. See also Berman, Once a Mortgage, supra note 13, at 92.
42 Matthews, supra note 37, at 249. At the same time, the savings and loan crisis wiped out
most home mortgage lenders creating an even greater need for capital infusion. See id.
43 See Coval et al., supra note 10, at 5.
4 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Analyzing Real Estate Loan Default in
the Era of Securitization, 50 EMoRY LJ. 519, 531-36 (2001).
4s See id. at 536.
4 Coval et al., supra note 10, at 6.
4 Indeed, this is the "special sauce" of why the securitization industry can be so lucrative. The
greater the percent of the pool that is rated higher (Le. lower yield) the more excess interest that can be stripped
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This process proved advantageous to many players in the industry. As
securitization grew, it greatly expanded the reach of the mortgage
investment business, allowing access to a venue once reserved for a select
group both interested and able to purchase whole loans. In fact, the
opening of a secondary market opened the gates to a wide range of
untapped national and international investors.4 8 The securitization
process made investments more accessible to a wider group of consumers
and introduced a steady stream of new funding sources in the real estate
market.49 In addition to a wider pool of funding sources, securitized
products from the secondary market also brought "lower interest rates,
availability of non-recourse financing, and higher loan to value ratios," as
well as lower investor risk.50 By providing a venue for the transfer or sale
of these secured assets, the securitization process creates a marketable,
liquid commodity, one that is easily moved across markets.
C. Market Size
Since its inception in the late 1970s, the RMBS market has grown
significantly. What started as a $700 million industry in 1978 has
increased over the years to an astounding billion dollar industry.52 The
early to mid 2000s saw record numbers, with each year showing an
increase over the previous year's issuance.53  In 2004, there were $864.2
billion issued in private-label RMBS. 4 In 2005, that number climbed to a
record high of $1.2 trillion.5 5  2008 saw a steep decline with only $48.6
billion issued in RMBS.56  Despite the sharp drop from previous years,
the amount of RMBS issued was still formidable.
off into the interest only ("10") piece of the offering. See Poindexter, supra note 44, at 542 n.111.
48 Coval et al., supra note 10, at 3-4.
4 See id. at 3.
5 Poindexter, supra note 44, at 529.
5t Id. at 522-23.
52 ROBERT P. POLLSEN ET AL, RATING TRANSmONS 2004: U.S. RMBS STEuAR PERFORMANCE
CONTINUES To SET RECORDS 2 Uan. 21, 2005), http/www2.standardandpoors.cor/sptpdf/fixedincome/
RMBSRatingsTransitions2004.pdf.
5 Id.
5 Id.
5 THOMAS WARRACK & ERNESTINE WARNER, U.S. RMBS MARKET STILL ROBUST, BUT
RISKS ARE INCREASING AND GROviTH DRIVERS ARE SOFTENING 2 (Jan. 19, 2006),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/medialsubprimermbs-robust01 1906.pdf.
56 See DBRS, FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. STRUCTURED FINANCE - RMBS: 2008 YEAR IN REVIEW
AND OUTLOOK FOR 2009 4 (Feb. 2009), http/A/www.dbrs.corr/research/226423.
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In September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into
conservatorship. The Federal Housing Agency now controls and directs
all operations.s? The implicit guarantee of the federal government was
made explicit when, in exchange for capital investment, the two GSEs
issued to the U.S. Treasury senior preferred stock and common stock
warrants representing an ownership stake of 79.9%. 8
The anticipated outlook for 2010 is not particularly promising as the
market continues to flounder, however the industry is looking to
initiatives from the new administration to revitalize the residential
housing market.59
According to several industry forecasts the RMBS market will
continue to struggle in the foreseeable future. 0 In 2009, Standard &
Poor's did not rate any U.S. RMBS transactions backed by new
originations and the company anticipates a similar market in 2010.61
Although the first new private label RMBS since 2008 was launched in
April 2010, analysts urged extreme caution in taking this as a full fledged
signal of the return of the RMBS private label market.62
II. DERIVATIVES AND THE RMBS MARKET
The two-decade economic period immediately prior to the recent
crash has been dubbed the "Great Moderation" due to its relatively sleepy,
s7 For specific information about the conservatorship, see N. ERIC WEISS, FANNIE MAE'S
AND FREDDIE MAC'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, CRS REP. RL
34661, at 4 (2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110096.pdf See also Courtney Hunter,
Financial Stabilization Measures, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 490, 494 (2009).
s5 Hunter, supra note 57, at 494-95.
5 DBRS, supra note 56, at 4.
6 Credit Investors Indicate 'Much Improved Outlook', STRUCTURED CREDIT INVESTOR, Mar. 3,
2010, http://www.structuredcreditinvestor.com ("In the US, opinions surrounding the commercial
and residential real estate [market] remained bleak"); David Adler, A Flat Dow for 10 Years? It Could
Happen, BARRON'S ONLINE, Dec. 28, 2009, http://online.barrons.com/article/
SB126170480773404971.html ("[T]his form of financing is all but dead ... .The securitization market
is still on its knees"). Likewise the ABS market is projected to remain non-existent according the JP
Morgan Chase. Posting ofJJ Homblass, to http://www.bankinnovation.net/profiles/blogs/no-joy-on-
the-securitization (Dec. 1, 2009, 9:33 EST) ("zero subprime mortgage ABS in 2010, just as there was
zero issuance for such assets in 2008 and 2009").
61 See Standard & Poor's, Ratings Direct on the Global Credit Portal,
http.//www.standardandpoors.con/ratingsdirect (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
6 Redwood Launch 'Doesn't Signal RMBS Return', STRUCTURED CREDIT INVESTOR, Apr. 22,
2010, http://www.structuredcreditinvestor.com.
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even-tempered lull.63  The system of structured finance efficiently
allocated capital supply with credit demand. However, the creeping but
steady entry of noxious assets, whose potential to undermine the trust that
bound these delicate financial inter-relationships was either over-looked,
underestimated, or misunderstood." The volatility in the residential
financial market arose in large part to the effects of derivatives. 65 Several
instruments in particular were at the center of the hurricane: ABCP,
CDOs and CDS. With strong investor demand for highly-rated securities
reducing credit costs, the market stepped up to create more and more
structured vehicles. These vehicles were reliant on the presumption of an
efficient and fungible rating system, and reinforced through a regulatory
environment that put more value on the accumulation of highly rated
portfolios in place of a more rigorous and issuer-idiosyncratic processes of
fundamental credit underwriting.66 The result of increasing piling on of
derivatives re-positioned the economic engine of the residential market.
Whereas the whole loan market was based on stable investment income,
this new market was based on fee generation. 67  Relying on a constant
stream of fee income produces different incentives than pursuing long-
term capital investment.
A ABCP
As explained previously the first step toward amassing a pool with an
eye towards securitization is to warehouse enough loans to fill the pool. 68
The warehouse is filled when loan originators - who can range from
traditional lenders such as thrifts and mortgage banks to the non-
traditional such as mortgage brokers - sell (often instantaneously) the
mortgages to a Special Purpose Entity ("SPE") after closing the loan with
6 See STEVEN J. DAVIS & JAMES A. KAHN, INTERPRETING THE GREAT MODERATION:
CHANGES IN THE VOIATILITY OF EcoNOMIC ACTIVITY AT THE MACRO AND MICRO LEVELS 1,
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Rep., No. 334, 2008), available at http://ssrn.conVabstract= 1166556.
64 See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie, How Much
Smoke, How Muds Fire?, 19J. ECON. PERSP. 159,175 (2005).
65 A derivative is a financial instrument, which derives its value from the value of some other
financial instrument or variable. BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 6, at 33.
6 See W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Charter Vaue Risk-Taking Incentives, and Emerging
Competitionfor Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 39J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 83,86 (2007).
67 Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al, The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues, FIN. MARKET
TRENDS, ORGANIsATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, at 5 (2008), available at
www.oecd.orgfdatsoecd/47/26V41942872.pdf.
68 See generaily Coval et al., supra note 10, at 5-6.
2010] 153
154 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:143
the borrowers. 6 9 As in any securitization the goal is two pronged: off load
non-payment risk (credit risk) and free up capital.70 The SPE will issue
short-term commercial paper to fund the acquisition from the originators.
Since it is a short-term investment (usually less than 180 days) the
issuance avoids registration under the Securities Act of 1933.
As a side event to the sale of the mortgages, the originators sign a
Mortgage Purchase Agreement with the SPE. This Purchase Agreement
generally contains representations and warranties for each mortgage
loan.72 Hence, there is the residual obligatory liability for originator to
buy back the loan. In these types of Agreements the originators usually
agreed to repurchase the mortgages or, to repay service premiums paid, if
they went into default within the 120-day period of warehousing.73 In
reality though, when the market was humming at full speed originators
acted as if they had no risk at all. Poor underwriting standards, now the
stuff of legend, resulted because the originators behaved as if they were
working in a risk free environment.
Underlying this transaction is a swap agreement between the SPE and
a financial institution (for sake of reference here, a Bank).' In exchange
for a guarantee of principal and interest repayment to holders of the
ABCP (the swap) the Bank receives the spread, the difference between the
average interest rate on the mortgages and the coupon on the paper.
The ABCP is rated 7 6 based on the strength on the credit worthiness of the
69 See id.
70 Id. at 3.
71 Registration is only required if the term is longer than 270 days. Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(10) (2006). See, also, Robert W. Mullen, Jr. & Michael J. Simon, United
States, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 643, 649 (1991); David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons
from the Mortgage Market Meltdown 6 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/research/MPFReport-final.pdo.
7 For a sample Purchase Agreement, see Correspondent Loan Purchase Agreement, available
at Nationwide Advantage Mortgage, http://www.nationwideadvantagemortgage.com (last visited Apr.
26, 2010).
7 Id.
74 See discussion of swaps infra Part II.C.
7s See generally Andreas A. Jobst, What is Structured Finance?, 8 SECURITIZATION CONDUIT 1
(2005) available at httpV/www.scribd.comf/doc/15554216'What-is-Structured-Finance-Securitization.
See also Posting of Adam Quinones to MartgW News Daily, htpi/wwrrtgnwily.con
mart grates'bkogl43544.aspx(Mar.31,2010, 1338EST).
76 For details on structured finance ratings, see Standard & Poor's website,
www.standardandpoors.com. Standard & Poor's bases its credit rating on many variables including,
for example, the creditworthiness of an obligor, its ability to meet financial commitments and the
priority of the obligation. For Issue Credit Rating Definitions, see Standard & Poors,
httpV/www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). See also Moodys.com,
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Bank. The swap is a "liquidity enhancer" because the Bank, as the swap
partner with the SPE, has the ultimate payment responsibility if there are
defaults in the underlying mortgages.77 ABCP was considered a less risky
investment and generally paid just above Treasury.78  As this is a trillion
dollar market, the spread did not have to be significant before it turns into
a very lucrative business. In addition to this spread, a fundamental profit
driver on the ABCP was the fee income the Bank generates for issuing
this liquidity enhancer. 79
At the end of the warehouse period the mortgages are sold into the
RMBS market (e.g. Fannie, Freddie or other securitization).so At the
close of the transaction the purchasers of the paper would be looking for
return of both interest and principal. This is paid when the loans leave
the warehouse facility and are purchased into the RMBS vehicle.81
This market works well as long as several financial engines continue
to run smoothly. First of all, the underlying mortgages cannot go into
default. Early period (i.e. within 120 days to one year of origination)
defaults were previously rare bordering on unheard of 8 2  Furthermore,
there must be an exit strategy for disposing of the warehoused mortgages
so that the ABCP could be retired after the 120-day investment period. At
first it worked very well. In 2005 approximately $720 billion was invested
in asset-backed securities.83 By 2007 (before the crash), it soared 48% to
$1.13 trillion due in large part to growth in this type of conduit lending.8
httpV/www.moodys.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
n See Simkovic, supra note 7, at 266.
78 Kronovet, supra note 16, at 298.
7 Poindexter, supra note 44, at 530; see also Sean O'Grady & Stephen Foley, The Year it Went
Crunch, INDEP. NEws & MEDIA LTD., Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.independent.ie/business/world/the-
year-it-went-crunch-1448819.html; Coval et. al., supra note 10, at 22.
8 For a discussion of the securitization process, see Simkovic, supra note 7.
81 Id.
8 Christopher J. Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults 15 (Finance and Economics
Discussion Series, Working Paper Group, Paper No. 2008-59), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200859/200859pap.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
8 Research Department, The Bond Market Association, Research: US Credit Market
Outlook 2006, http//www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/ResearchReports/2006/Outlook_
USCreditMarketOutlook_200601 BMA.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010) (referring to ABS paper).
For an explanation of ABCP's relationship to ABS, see FRANK J. FABOZzi, THE HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 163 (2002).
8 Randall Smith et al., New Villain in Market Drama: Commenial Paper-Banks Pressed to Sell Short-
Tenn Investments, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2007, at Cl; see generally Hortense Leon, Locked Up, 68 MORTGAGE
BANKING, Jul. 1, 2008, at 24 (for a discussion of capital finds and mortgage backed securities).
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As long as there was an RMBS market to offload the mortgages as the
paper became due, the pipeline flowed.
However, as we know all too well, soaring defaults in the home
mortgage market brought this market to a halt. The current crisis
introduced the moniker "juvenile delinquents" to the lending lexicon.
These loans were 90 days or more in default during the first year after
origination. The juvenile delinquents clogged the pipelines of the
securitization model. Although the Purchase Agreements contained buy
back provisions they were of little or no use.86 Originators who had
assumed they had no risk were suddenly faced with mounting liability and
many, such as American Home Mortgage and New Century, declared
bankruptcy (with Countrywide narrowly escaping with a rescue by Bank
of America).
Defaults in previously securitized loans clogged up the exit strategy.
As will be analyzed in the CDO discussion, this market virtually shut
down and closed off the pipe line. As the crisis worsened past the 90-120
paper expiration dates, default rates blew up." The birds of short term
lending came home to roost in the nest of long-term liabilities.
Investment bank balance sheets were (in the instant immediately prior to
that disappearance of investor interest) so built out that they were unable
to sustain demand for the next round of securities that were coming off
the warehouse lines of the mortgage originators. A link in the system had
been broken, resulting in debilitating convulsions to previously stable
funding sources. Capital essentially seized up with outlets at full
capacity. 89
85 Andrew Haughwout et al., juvenile Delinquent Mortgages: Bad Credit or Bad Economy?, 64 J.
URB. EcoN. 246, 247 (2008) (also called "early default"). In fact, many participants in the industry
were surprised by the degree of early defaults. Id. at 256; see also Gene Amromin & Anna L. Paulson,
Comparing Patterns ofDefault Among Prime and Subprime Mortgages, 33 EcON. PERSP. 18, 30-32 (2009).
86 The enforceability of the Purchase Agreement was determined to turn on the language of the
agreement not underlying economic responsibilities. See Calyon NY. Branch v. Am. Home Mortgage Corp,
379 B.R 503,519 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
7 See Elaine Korry, Bank of America Acquires Countrywide for $4 Bilion, NPR, Jan. 11, 2008,
httpV/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 18028482. For details about American Home
Mortgage and New Century, see Steven Church & Bradley Keoun, American Home Files for Bankruptcy After
Shutdown, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 6, 2007, httpV/www.bloombergcomtapps/news?pid=20601087&sid=
aFEWSOC51PKc&refer=home.
8 See David Messerschnitt, Ovewiew ofthe Subprime Mortgage Market, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L 3,
7(2007).
8 As the volume of flow fell below capacity, the actual costs of per unit production skyrocketed, such
that dramatically fewer underlying borrowers have had practical access to credit relative to the amount of loans
that were being made in 2005 and 2006. Press Release, Association for Financial Professionals, Main Street at
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B. CDOs
CDOs have benignly been defined as investment-grade securities
backed by a pool of bonds, loans and other assets." In today's press, they
are most often described as "toxic assets" or "garbage" 91 This perceptual
metamorphosis has more to do with how CDOs were injected into the
RMBS landscape than their economic function. They present a classic
example of how an existing, almost mundane, investment vehicle can be
turned into a powerful (and woefully misunderstood) market driver.
CDOs originated in the 1970s but began to grow in the 1980s.9 2006
annual issuance was $520.6 billion.93 Overall mortgage backed CDO
issuance peaked in the second quarter of 2007 with the quarterly issuance
Risk from Frozen Credit Markets (Sept. 30, 2008) available at http/www.afponline.orgpub/pr/
pr_20080930 survey.htrml.
9 Sally Pittman, Arms, But No Legs To Stand On: "Subprime" Solutions Plague the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX TECH. L. REv. 1089, 1101 (2008) (quoting James Covert, Look Out Below!!!:
Battered Stock Marks in Free Fall, N.Y. PosT, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://www.nypost.con/seven/01 182008/news/regionalnews/look out below 875271.htm). See also
John C. Kelly, An Introduction to Commercial Real Estate CDOS (Part 1), 21 PROB. & PROP. 38, 38 (2007)
("In a CDO, a special purpose vehicle is organized to hold a diversified portfolio of assets that is
financed through the vehicle's issuance of securities.").
9 Cf Paul M. Jonna, Comment, In Search of Market Discipline: The Casefor Indirect Hedge Fund
Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 989, 1002 (2008) (quoting Jon Markman, Are We Headed for an Epic
Bear Market?, MSN Money, Sept. 20, 2007, httpV/articles.moneycentral.msn.conInvesting/
SuperModels/AreWeHeadedForAnEpicBearMarket.aspx) ("It is believed that many of these subprime
loans were 'invented so that hedge funds would have high-yield debt to buy.'"). The author writes
that Wall Street advanced the proliferation of these risky loans to questionable borrowers. Id. In the
Practising Law Institute's Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook, the drive for these
instruments was described as "a gluttonous appetite for financial instruments of incomprehensible
risk like Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, Credit Default Swaps, Auction Rate Securities,
Derivatives and a host of arcane concoctions that generated enormous profits from the leakage off the
financial trash heap, an alchemy of disaster." Frederick W. Rosenberg, Securities Arbitration in the
Market Meltdown Era: Achieving Fairness in Perception and Reality - The Madoff Distraction, 1754 PLI/CORP.
75, 80-81 (2009). See also Chana Joffe-Walt & David Kestenbaum, We Bought a Toxic Asset; You Can
Watch it Die, NPR, Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 124491608;
Chris Arnold, Auditor: Supervisors Covered Up Risky Loans, May 27, 2008, http;//www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=90840958.
92 Richard E. Mendales, Intensive Care for the Public Corporation: Securities Law, Corporate
Governance, and the Reorganization Process, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 979,981 n.10 (2008).
9 See Secs. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n, Global CDO Market Issuance Data 2 (2009), available at
http;//www.sifma.org/researcl/pdf/CDOData2008-Q4.pdf. [hereinafter Global CDO]; Matthews,
supra note 37, at 255 ("Of $1.5 trillion in outstanding CDO value worldwide, between $500 billion
and $600 billion is backed by some type of mortgage-backed security.").
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of $178.6 billion.94 2007 annual issuance dropped 8% to $481 billion and
the entire market evaporated in the credit crisis. 95 2008 annual issuance
dipped to $56 billion.96 A more telling signal of death in this market was
the fourth quarter of 2008, which struggled to achieve a paltry $5 billion.97
Indeed, this type of cash flow CDO is structured finance: an SPE
holds a pool of debt contracts. The capital structure is sliced and tranched
based on differences in credit quality.98 The key to understanding the role
that CDOs played in the financial crisis is to acknowledge the lack of
credit quality in pool of debt contracts and why this dearth of quality
existed. It is antithetical to a lender's nature to make a loan to a borrower
that that lender knows has a low probability of repayment. The ability to
sell the loan immediately into the secondary market erases this risk.99 In a
"normal" RMBS scenario the pooling and tranching of the primary pool
would have kept these types of loans out of the pool.'1 However,
insatiable investor appetite for higher yielding investment smoothed the
path of securitization of low quality loans. One method simply pooled
the low credit quality loans into a CDO offering.'0o Another, more
sophisticated method entailed spinning the lower rated tranches of an
94 See Global CDO, supra note 93, at 1.
9 Id. at 2.
9 SECS. INDUS. & FIN. MKTs. Ass'N, CAPITAL MARKET ISSUANCE DECLINED TO $5.0
TRILLION IN 2008, RESEARCH QUARTERLY 2 tbl., Mar. 2009, available at
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/ResearchReports/2009/CapitalMarketsResearchQuarte
rly_200903_SIFMA.pdf.
9 See Global CDO, supra note 93, at 2.
9 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1019, 1019 (2007). A "synthetic" CDO follows the same pooling and tranching procedure.
Id. The difference is that the SPE does not actually purchase the debt contracts, but rather credit
default swaps. Id. These swaps (rather than the debt contracts) are the basis of valuing the synthetic
pool. See id. at 1024. In this fashion, the credit risks are similar to those in the ABCP. See supra Part
IIA
* Subject to any repurchase agreement, this is known as the "originate-to-distribute-model."
See Amromin & Paulson, supra note 85, at 24.
1oo Cf Forte, supra note 2, at 11 ("[Tlhere had been substantial issuance of residential MBS
comprised entirely of so-called subprime loans to borrowers whose credit (and lenders whose
underwriting) was substandard. The below A-rated tranches of these subprime securitizations ...
were perfect candidates (in the issuer or investors' estimate) for inclusion with other unrelated, often
non-real-estate, assets into CDOs."). This is because the higher the average quality loans in the pool,
the more likely the issuance will be tranched with lower subordination levels. In other words, the
higher the quality of the underlying mortgages, the greater the likelihood that a greater proportion of
the issuance will reside in the AAA tranche, thus increasing the spread.
1o1 See Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 27 BANKING & FIN.
SERVS.POLYREP. 1 (2008).
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RMBS securitization into a separate CDO. 0 2  Using either method,
lenders of the CDO issuance will contain a AAA tranche based on less
than AAA cash flow.'03 Indeed, subprime RMBS "comprised the 'largest
collateral asset class in [CDOs] since the inception of the product in
1999.'""
The ability to immediately divest themselves of loans with no thought
to repayment scenarios explains why lenders made loans that were now
lumped under the heading of "sub-prime." These loans then formed the
backbone of the income stream that underwrote the resulting CDOs. In
this fashion, Americans chasing the dream of homeownership collide with
investors chasing yield. The collision occurred because the common
language of credit ratings was carelessly'05 (some might say maliciously)
warped by derivatively spinning off the risk. As explained above, in a
CDO offering the issuer could bundle the BBB tranche of an RMBS
issuance.106 Already they have picked off a decidedly riskier piece of the
RMBS vehicle. This BBB tranche would be pooled and blended with
other BBB tranches, repackaged, resized and retrenched.'0 7  One
argument is that if the rating agencies fixed the formula for rating the
CDO, the issuer could find assets that would generate a CDO where the
tranches are more valuable than the underlying assets.108  In fact, a very
large share of the total value of the securities issued were rated AA or AAA
by the credit rating agencies.109
However, the resulting AAA piece would nonetheless represent
nothing more than the best of the mediocre. As the market would
eventually expose, the rating criteria failed to reflect the risks of the
subprime mortgages in the pool.1 o Instead, the rating agencies relied on
mathematical models built on historical data."' These structured AAA
rated securities grew explosively just prior to the crash. One
102 See Forte, supra note 2, at 11.
103 S id.
104 Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance ofPredatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2067 (2007).
15 See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for
Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1011, 1024 (2009) ("[G]atekeepers may shamelessly
leverage their autonomy in order to extract greater revenues from their clients . .
106 See Parnoy & Skeel, supra note 98, at 1042-43.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1041-42.
10 See President's Working Group on Fin. Mkts., Policy Statement on Financial Market
Developments, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 447,448-49 (2008).
Ito Manns, supra note 105, at 1044.
III Id. at 1044-45.
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commentator estimates that as of March 2007 there were over 14,000 AAA
rated structured securities (comprised of RMBS and CDO) as compared
to fewer than 500 "natural" AAA rated U.S. corporations, foreign
sovereigns and U.S. municipals." 2  Paradoxically, the very institutions
that were claiming to transfer credit risk off their balance sheets and into
the capital markets were, themselves, doubling back and re-engaging this
very risk. At the inception of the financial melt down, financial firms held
48% of the AAA rated CDOs on non-prime mortgages." 3
Along side of this increased supply arose what some might term an
insatiable growth in demand. For example, of the 1,185 regulatory
changes that occurred in the world's major industrialized financial
economies, between 1991 and 2000, 1,121 of these changes had the
express purpose of liberalizing capital flow for direct investment." 4 These
changes resulted in an intense demand chasing a limited amount of blue
chip assets.' 1 Paradoxically, because these structured securities would
still command the prized AAA rating, they were available for purchase by
investors who were bound (for legal reasons) to purchase AAA
securities.'6 These investors misperceived the risk of otherwise risky
investment because the rating agencies rated the CDOs using the same
rating structure used in the RMBS market." 7  In addition, many global
investors did not undertake their own independent credit analysis before
investing in these CDOs." 8  Instead, they relied upon the rating in
making investment decisions or signaling risk profiles.1 19 Homebuyers
112 See Gretchen Morgenson, Summer School for Investors is in Session, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2007,
at BU6 tbl.
113 Aaron Unterman, Perverse Incentives: Risk Taking and Reform, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVS.
POLY REP. 11, 12 (2009).
114 Kevin Fox Gotham, The Secondary Circuit of Capital Reonsidemd: Gloaization and the US. Real Estate
Sector, 112 AM.J. Soc. 231, 250 (2006).
115 See id.
116 For regulatory reasons, some large investors, such as pension funds, are limited in the
quality of investments they can make. See, e.g., Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 5 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also Manns, supra note 105, at 1042; Matthews, supra
note 37, at 254.
"17 For more discussion about rating agencies, see generally Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating
Agencies, 82 WAsH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private
Ordering ofPublic Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
"1 See President's Working Group, supra note 109, at 448-49.
119 Id. at 449. See also Forte, supra note 2, at 21. This problem was especially acute for foreign
investors who may have blindly relied on the published credit ratings without understanding the
collateral for the CDO. See also Frank Partnoy, Historical Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger,
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with poor credit scores financed investors demanding low risk
investments. A recipe for disaster was created.
However flawed the model may be though, the risk misperception
was at least tied to a complex risk modeling scheme to determine the
break points of tranches. Pricing was not nearly as precise.12 0 Pricing of
the securities was more art than science. Limited information, rumor and
innuendo ruled over mathematical rigor.121 Bonds are not traded like
stock. Trading in CDOs lacked the structure of a dedicated exchange or a
similar rules-set trading reporting requirement that is in force in other
large and interconnected markets. Putting this together-buyers, newly
liberated from regulatory strictures, invested heavily in complex,
misunderstood securities that were rated on a less than transparent rating
scheme for a price not determined by an open market.
The false sense of security lent by artificially inflated assets coupled
with the insatiable "quest for yield"122 met up with insufficient regulation
and sketchy pricing. While separate and apart, perhaps these symptoms
may not have been so destructive. Together, however, they wrecked
havoc on the shaky foundations of the securities market. An often posed
query is how much of a role hedge funds played in the financial
meltdown. There is no question that these high yield investments fueled
the fires in both igniting and satisfying this desire for yield. Investors
demanded high yield debt and hedge funds more than provided for that
need.123
When this delicate balance became unhinged, large funds collapsed
under the weight of subprime CDOs.12 4 This was further compounded
by the fact that hedge fund participation, once reserved for those with a
specific net worth and sophistication, now extended to the average
investor, who may not have been as investment savvy as more seasoned
investors.125  As the crisis progressed, concerned investors withdrew
monies from previously lucrative hedge funds in an effort to avoid greater
the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two Theories About the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 431, 442 (2009) ("Financial innovation dovetailed with overdependence on ratings to generate
trillions of dollars of highly-rated tranches of CDOs and SIVs that appeared safe, but were not.").
120 See Antonio E. Bernardo & Bradford Cornell, The Valuation of Complex Derivatives by Major
Investment Finns: Empirical Evidence, 52 J. FiN. 785, 797 (1997).
121 See id. at 797.
122 O'Grady & Foley, supra note 79.
123 Jonna, supra note 91, at 1002.
124 See id. at 1002-03 (discussing the fall of two giant Bear Stearns funds).
125 See id. at 1007 (exploring the "retailization" of hedge funds in which they have become more
readily available to the general public, as opposed to a select, financially stable few).
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losses.12 6 There was less and less capital to lubricate the market. Riskier
funds were particularly affected. Fearing the volatility of the market,
investors were no longer willing to assume such risk. 127
The role of hedge funds in causing (or at least exacerbating) the
financial crisis remains open to debate. On the one hand, the profitability
and resultant popularity of hedge funds has driven creditors to ignore or
change margins.128 Furthermore, the sheer volume of these complicated
transactions calls into doubt whether the risk of exposure can be
accurately assessed.129  On the other hand, hedge funds have their
admirers citing the many positive attributes and benefits they bring to the
economy, including the proliferation of liquidity in the market. 130
The bottom line is that hedge fund investment in CDOs played some
part in the crisis. They were not the key factor and, perhaps only played a
small part, but it was the interplay of small parts that caused everything to
come crashing down. The issue is where to go from here? Specific
reform ideas must address the lack of transparency of the funds. Some
have suggested more restrictions and more stringent regulation of hedge
funds.13 ' This approach is not without its critics, including former
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who fear increased economic
126 See, e.g., Andrew Clark End of the Hedge Fund Era as Credit Cunch Prompts $525bn Evodus,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2009, httpV/www.guardianco.uk/money/2009jan22Vus-economy-hedge-finds.
According to The Guardian's estimates, $525 billion was withdrawn from hedge funds in the second half of
2008. Id.
127 See Miles Costello, Fore of Credit Cunch Made Plain as 170 Hedge Funds Crash in Three Monds,
TIMEs ONLINE, June 20, 2008, http//business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/businessindustjy_sectors/
bankingand~finance/artice4175616.ece.
12 See id.; Clark supra note 126.
129 See Jonna, supra note 91, at 1027 (quoting Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank ofAdanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island,
Georgia: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006) (transcript available online at
httpf/www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200651ahtm)).
130 Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Finandal Market: Witten Testimony Submitted to the United
States H. Comm. on Owmsight and Govt' Reform, (2008), available at http-/ssrnacom/abstract= 1302705 ("[H]edge
funds did not cause the financial crisis and are in fact helping to mitigate its damage and save taxpayers money.
... [I]n fact hedge funds have historically made markets more stable and helped their investors conserve
wealth in times of economic stress.").
131 There are two bills currently circulating through Congress, both aiming to reform section
203(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940: The Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009,
H.R 711, 111th Cong. (2009) (amending 15 U.S.C. SS 80a-80b) and The Hedge Fund Transparency
Act as a means to return authority to the SEC. See Hedge Fund Law Blog, Hedge Fund Adviser
Registration Act of 2009, Apr. 6, 2009, http;//www.hedgefundlawblog.com/hedge-fund-transparency-
act-text.html; Hedge Fund Law Blog, Hedge Fund Transparency Act Text, Feb. 2, 2009,
http//www.hedgefundlawblog.com/hedge-fund-adviser-registration-act-of-2009.html.
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instability and the push of these funds to locales out of the reach of
regulation. 132
C. CDS
Some commentators have analogized credit default swaps ("CDS") to
insurance.133 Like health, home or auto insurance, there is risk exposure
for defined acts (loan default versus sickness, fire, accidents). In the case
of health insurance, an insurer bets that its insured clients do not get sick.
The individual purchasing the insurance wagers that she will get sick.
However, the analogy between CDS and traditional insurance ultimately
breaks down because we are really talking more about risk shifting than risk
taking. In a swap, the risk rests with a party outside the swap transaction
(the borrower on the underlying loan).134 There is no third party in a
traditional insurance arrangement. In a swap transaction, a creditor lends
money upon the assumption that the borrower will pay it back in full and
on time with interest. However, a creditor is able to shift that risk, i.e.
hedge the bet, by entering into a credit default swap with a
counterparty.13 5 Now the lender is, in fact, betting that the borrower will
experience a "credit event" (as defined in the swap agreement)'3 6 and is
willing to pay a fee to the counterparty to shift that riskl 37  The
counterparty is betting that no credit event will occur and they will collect
their fee and will never have to pay the lender the principal and interest
on the underlying loan. 38
Credit default swaps were once the dreary backbone to municipal
finance issuances.139 However, like other derivatives discussed here, their
involvement in the RMBS market transformed an "obscure instrument"
132 See Jonna, supra note 91, at 1010 (citing Private-sator Refnancing ofthe Lar Hedge Fund Long-Tenn
Capita) Management: Hearing Before de H Comm. on Banking and Fin. Sens., 105th Cong. 160-61 (1998)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors), available at
httpVAww.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htnt See also Shadab, supra note 130.
133 David Anderson & Sarah Hodges, Credit Crisis Litigation: An Overview ofIssues and Outcomes,
6 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP. 1, 4 (2009).
134 Unterman, supra note 113, at 16-17.
135 Id.
136 Cf id. at 16 n.26. The "credit event" usually refers to defiulting on the underlying loan.
Other "credit events" include debt restructuring and filing for bankruptcy of the borrower. Simkovic,
supra note 7, at 271.
137 See Simkovic, supra note 7, at 271.
13 Id.
139 See Unternun, supra note 113, at 16.
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into an "intrinsic part of the credit crisis vocabulary."'"4 They were
viewed as relatively inexpensive insurance policies, but they hid explosive
exposure. Strapping a swap transaction on the back of a home loan
magnifies the risk exposure in the case of default on the loan. The CDS
market grew very quickly. In 2001, there were $631 billion in CDS
outstanding. By 2007, the market peaked at $62.2 trillion.141
As with the other derivatives described herein, CDS are traded over
the counter and not subject to securities regulation. 14 2 In fact, they were
so close in nature to another failed investment scheme-the bucket
shop-there was considerable concern that they violated the law that
makes bucket shops illegal.'43  In response to these concerns, The
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 explicitly exempted
credit default swaps from the bucket shop laws. 1" The same act also
exempted CDS from regulation by the Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission and the SEC.141
The problems with lack of transparency and inability to intelligently
assess risk are magnified logarithmically in a CDS transaction. Not only
is basic financial information hard to come by-it is actively shielded.
Market participants are often unaware of counterparty identities, 4 6 and
the leading industry group, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, resists attempts at mandatory disclosure.' 4 7  Issuers of these
securities failed to correctly identify the true risk-if the borrowers on the
underlying transaction failed to pay the insured party (the lender) will
look to the issuer not for the interest lost, but rather for the entire loan
principal.
As if the lack of transparency and complex risk structure were not
enough, these CDS were precariously poised on top of CDOs.
Investment banks sought to shield themselves from CDO losses by
140 Id.
14 INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS'N, INC., SUMMARIES OF MARKET SURVEY RESULTS
(1995-2009), http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent/html (last visited Mar. 1, 2010); Unterman, supra
note 113, at 16.
142 Unterman, supra note 113, at 16.
143 For a complete explanation of bucket shops, see David Hochfelder, "Where the Common People
Could Speculate": The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Ongins ofPopular Participation in Financial Markets, 1880-1920,
93 J. AM. HIST. 335 (2006). See also Posting ofYves Smith to Naked Capitalism, Eric Dinallo: We Modernised
Oursels into dius heAge, httpV/www.nakedcapitalism.con/2009/03/ericdinallo-we-modernised-ourselves.hul
(Mar. 31, 2009, 135 EST).
144 7 U.S.C. S 27f (2000).
145 Id. 5 27e.
146 Simkovic, supra note 7, at 274-75.
147 Id. at 275.
JUMBLED ALPHABET SOUP
purchasing CDS.148 To even further complicate the economic volatility
posed by these derivatives, the market was extraordinarily concentrated.
In 2007, the 10 largest participants accounted for 90% of the market.4
The poster child for these investments was American International Group
("AIG"). AIG sold approximately $440 billion in CDS on CDOs.'50  In
the now all too familiar story, AIG's derivative trading subsidiary, AIG
Financial Products, lost over $18 billion on its CDS portfolio in late 2007
and early 2008.151 AIG, guarantor of AIG Financial Products obligations,
was bailed out by the Federal Reserve with a loan of $85 billion.' 52
m. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The tentacles of regulation barely touched many aspects of these
derivative markets. There was an imperfect fit between existing
regulation and such creative financing. Financial innovation tests the
boundaries of existing regulatory strictures. Not only are innovations
such as ABCP, CDOs and CDS complex and difficult to comprehend,
they do not fit well in the established rule based (as opposed to principle
based) regulatory environment.15 3 In addition to rating agencies (which is
not, strictly speaking, a regulatory function as it is private versus public),
several sectors of regulatory oversight are implicated: banking regulation,
SEC regulation and GSE regulation. All of these work together in an
alchemy of regulatory arbitrage. Using the complexity of the
sophisticated securities, investors take advantage of the regulatory
advantages (such as net capital requirements, limitations on ratings, etc.)
and hold the highly rated structured finance tranches instead of direct
investment in the underlying cash flow.'54
148 Id. at 283-85. See also Unterman, supra note 113, at 17.
149 Unterman, supra note 113, at 17.
150 See Testimony Concerning the Role of Federal Regulators: Lessons from the Credit Crisis for the Future
of Regulation: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm.), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/2008/ts102308cc.htm. See also Simkovic, supra note 7, at 284; Mark Pittman, Goldman,
Merrill Collect Billions After Fed's AIG Bailout Loans, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 29, 2008,
httpV/www.bloomberg.con/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aTzTYtlNHSG8.
1s' Simkovic, supra note 7, at 276.
152 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept 16, 2008), available at
http/www.federareserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm. Accord Simkovic, supra note 7, at 277.
153 See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shfit: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2
BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339,340 (2008).
154 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 98, at 1041-42 (providing a more complete discussion of
regulatory arbitrage).
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A. Bank Regulation
Reliance on ratings as a proxy of safety extended the reach of
derivative risks across industry sectors. As bank managers participated
more and more in the derivative market, their exposure to loss grew. As
discussed above, the meaning of "AAA" warped in response to market
demand with the resultant apparent effect of moderated risk.155
Furthermore, international banking regulations were reformed by such
accords as Basel 11.156 These modifications operationalized the role of
ratings from the ratings agencies and transformed them into just another
tool for managing balance sheet risk.1s7  As such, the ratings game gave
Bank managers incentives to substitute subtle differences between AAA,
Aa, A and Baa as a 21V century lexicon for risk management. 158
Armed with the requisite rating to give regulatory and legal cover,
banks and other financial service firms fed their liquidity levels with
investment in CDOs. Banks sponsored off shore entities called
Structured Investment Vehicles ("SIVs") that borrowed money in the
short-term commercial paper market in order to make long term
investments in CDOs that were often populated with sub-prime loans. 15 9
In March 2008, members of the Senate Banking Committee spotted the
failure of federal regulators to recognize the risks in the CDO market. 160
However, this chastising fell on deaf ears as the Bush Administration and
the regulators seemed loath to acknowledge that regulatory failure played
a part in the burgeoning economic crisis.161
The Obama Administration, in contrast, acknowledges the role
regulation, or the lack thereof, has played in the crisis and has publicized
plans for the reform of certain banking regulations as part of the overall
plan for economic reform. Included in President Obama's plans are
1ss See Malloy, supra note 101, at 3.
'n See generally Bank for International Settlements, Basel : International Comegence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (2004), http/www.bis.org/publ/bcbsI07.htm (the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision worked to "secure international convergence on revisions to supervisory
regulations governing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks.").
157 See generally Rolf H. Weber & Aline Darbellay, The Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings in Bank Capital
Requirement Regulations, 10J. BANKING & REG. 1, 8 (2008).
158 See id. at 2-3.
159 Forte, supra note 2, at 11-12.
16o See Testimony Concerning Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations:
Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm.), available at
http//www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts042208cc.htm.
161 Malloy, supra note 101, at 2.
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proposals for a Financial Services Oversight Council to oversee potential
risks and improve interagency collaboration, instituting a Consumer
Financial Protection Agency to protect individuals at the consumer level
and enacting regulations increasing capital requirements and transparency
while reducing the significance of ratings by the credit agencies.162
B. SEC Regulation
It is no surprise that lack of regulation plays a role in the growth of
these derivative markets as well as the hedge funds that were the
significant buyers of derivatives such as CDOs, ABCP and CDS. Unlike
other investments that are regulated under the watchful eye of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, these derivatives were deregulated
and flourished under a self-regulated market.'" Although investors such
as hedge funds, pension plans and insurance firms are not the typical
investor that needs the protection afforded by SEC registration and
disclosure regulations, this lack of oversight and the complexity of the
investments without oversight led to disaster. Self-regulation stands at
complete odds with market discipline when the same parties that reaped
huge economic benefit from the unregulated environment are charged
with policing the industry. The fact is that hedge funds were significant
buyers of the riskier equity and subordinated tranches of CDOs and of
asset-backed securities, including securities backed by nonconforming
residential mortgages.'6 This problem is further exacerbated by the fact
that most SEC enforcement and regulatory attention is in equity, not
debt. 165 The SEC did not open an investigation until June 2007-after
Bear Stearns collapsed.16
16 For a detailed account of proposed presidential reforms on banking regulations, see Executive
Summary of Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation, WAu. ST. J. ONLNE, available at
http//online.wsj.con/public/resources/documentsrefom.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
163 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does The Treasury Have a
Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 731 (2009) ("Arguably, the deeper origins of the 2008 financial
meltdown may lie in deregulatory measures, taken both by Congress and the SEC, which placed some
categories of derivatives and some firms beyond effective regulation."). The self-regulating body is
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"). See Unterman, supra note 113, at 19-
20.
164 Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 7 (2006).
165 See Posting of Yves Smith to Naked Capitalism, How Succesful Will the SEC Investigation of
CDOs and Bear Hedge Funds Be?, http;//www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/06/how-successful-will-sec-
investigations.html (June 27, 2007, 2:19 EST).
166 Bear Stearns collapsed over the weekend of Marchl5-16, 2008. O'Grady & Foley, supra
note 79.
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In response to the cries for regulation of the derivatives market, the
U.S. Treasury Department issued a "Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure."'67 The significant problem in regulating
these securities lies in the conundrum that if left to their mundane,
unsophisticated use, there would be no burning need for regulating these
derivatives. Butjust as pharmaceuticals approved for one use explode into
problems when put to another use,168 the "off label" use of derivatives
caused the problems we are now sorting through. Whether the regulatory
scheme is based on "rules" or on "principles,"' 69 innovation will leap over
regulation. It makes more sense to regulate the players in the market than
the investments themselves. To that end, one area ripe for regulation is
hedge funds.
Unlike other investment companies, hedge funds are not subject to
the Investment Company Act of 1940.170 A new approach is needed, one
that will strike a balance between "decreased regulation to attract hedge
funds and increased regulation to protect investors and the domestic
market."'71 Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke called for
hedge funds to be held to greater disclosure of their "strategies and risk
profile," thereby creating more transparency.172  Currently there are
several avenues of regulation under consideration that would close the gap
on hedge fund regulation, including new legislation in both the U.S.
House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. Both bills before
Congress aim to reform section 203(b) of the 1940 Act.173  The Hedge
167 U.S. TRFAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE,
(2008), available at httpV/www.treas.gov/presWreleases/reportWBlueprintpdf See also Coffee & Sale, supra note
163, at 715.
168 For example, Propafol is safely used during routine surgery as anesthesia. However, when used as
a sedative for sleep it has lethal consequences, as MichaelJackson's death unfortunately illustrated. See Ashley
Surdin, Coroner Attributes Midael Jadeson's Death to Sedative, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, available at
http/v/w.washingtonpost.condwp-dy/content/article2009/024/AR2009082402193.htmL
169 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 163, at 716.
170 Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7)(A) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provide exemptions from
the Act's registration requirement for funds held by less than 100 owners and for funds held by "qualified
purchasers." Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7)(A) (2008).
171 Laszlo Ladi, Note and Comment, Hedge Funds: The Case Against Increased Global Regulation in
Light of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 5 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REv. 99, 100-01 (2008).
172 SeeJonna, supra note 91, at 1027 (quoting Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island,
Georgia: Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (May 16, 2006) (transcript available online at
http;//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200605l6a.htm)).
173 Hedge Fund Transparency Act, S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009); Hedge Fund Adviser Registration
Act, H.R 711, 111th Cong (2009).
JUMBLED ALPHABET SOUP
Fund Transparency Act is more of an overhaul of the system and would
redesign the regulation of hedge funds while the Hedge Fund Adviser
Registration Act would close a loophole in the Investment Act.174
The Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act repeals the exception to the
registration requirement provided by section 203(b) (3) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940.17 Under this exception, advisers with fewer than 15
clients and who do not hold themselves out to the public as investment
advisers were not required to register with the SEC.176 Under the
Registration Act, all hedge fund managers would have to register as
investment advisors 77 The Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act was
originally introduced in 2007 by Senator Grassley.17 8  The present version
of this Act was referred to the House Committee on January 29, 2009 and
has since been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services.' 79
It has not been passed yet.'80
The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009 which, while also
requiring hedge funds managers to register with the SEC, would require
hedge funds to submit certain information to the SEC.'' Hedge fund
advisers were concerned about disclosing information about their
investors but Grassley and Levin, the senators who introduced the bill,
"have since clarified that their bill does not require disclosure of hedge
fund clients who merely invest in the fund."1 2 Senator Grassley, one of
the authors of the bill, hopes to give the SEC back its authority with this
bill."'
174 See supra note 173.
17s H.R 711, 111th Cong. S 2 (2009).
176 15 U.S.C. 5 80b-3(b)(3) (2008).
177 For a summary of the Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act, see Press Release, Sen.
Grassley Introduces the Hedge Fund Registration Act of 2007-05-15 (May 15, 2007), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel-dataPagelD_1502=11641.
178 Hedge Fund Transparency Act, S. 1402, 110th Cong. (2007). For details of bill see
http;//www.grassley.senate.gov (go to Issues & Legislation tab; then select legislation introduced and
scroll to the S. 1402 hyperlink).
179 Information on the status of this bill can be found on the Library of Congress's website,
http;//thomas.loc.gov/ (go to Search Bill Summary & Status; select bill number and type in S. 344).
180 Id.
'1 S. 344, 111th Cong. (2009).
182 Rachelle Younglai, Hedge Fund Bill to Give SEC Registration Authority, REUTERS, April 28,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLNE53RO2D20090428.
18a Press Release, Grassley and Levin Introduce Hedge Fund Transparency Bill (Jan. 29, 2009),
available at http//grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPagelD 1502=19024 (floor statement of
Carl Levin introducing Bill to the Senate).
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An indirect route, regulating the creditors and the participants, rather
than the funds themselves, may also be a prudent avenue. This could be
implemented by amending ERISA to include a provision permitting
private pension funds to invest only in a hedge fund that has disclosed
certain "material information and is registered with the SEC"I and for
the creditors of hedge funds to lend only to hedge funds that have released
the requested information.185
C. GSE Regulation
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are subject to numerous approvals,
reviews and regulations of the government. First, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are required to obtain the approval of the U.S. Treasury
before issuing debt. 186  However, such requests have historically been a
mere formality because the Treasury has never denied any request by the
companies to issue debt.'" Second, any proposed programs by the
companies are reviewed by HUD to ensure that affordable housing
standards are met.188 Third, the Federal Housing Enterprises Safety and
Soundness Act of 1992 established the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO").'89 OFHEO has the power to regulate
both Freddie Mae and Fannie Mac.190 OFHEO establishes capital
standards, conducts financial examinations and determines appropriate
capital levels for the companies.191 Finally, the President of the United
18 Jonna, supra note 91, at 1016.
t8 Id. at 1025.
186 Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 12 U.S.C. S 1719(b) (2008) ((applies to Fannie
Mae) ("[T]he corporation is authorized to issue, upon the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury ... obligations . . . .")); id. S 1455(j)(1) ((applies to Freddie Mac) ("Any notes ... of the
Corporation evidencing money borrowed ... shall be issued upon the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury...
187 David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's
Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REv. 1019, 1034 (2008).
1s See generally 12 U.S.C. S5 4541, 4561-4567 (2008).
189 The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) was established as an
independent entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development by the Federal
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992. 12 U.S.C. S 4501 et seq. (2008).
19 Regulations concerning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be found at 12 U.S.C. S 4511 et
seq. See also Fannie Mae, httpV/www.fanniemae.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) and Freddie Mac,
http//www.freddiemac.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
191 Reiss, supra note 187, at 1035.
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States has the power to appoint five members of the board of directors for
each company and may remove any appointed member for good cause.1 92
In July 2008, Congress attempted to contain the economic
conflagration raging from GSE based RMBS. The Housing and
Economic Recovery Act ("HERA") expanded and solidified federal
authority over the GSEs. 193 Under HERA, the U.S. government put
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship in an effort to keep the
companies solvent and established the Federal Housing Financing Agency
("FHFA") to control and oversee the companies. 194  Under the plan,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were permitted to slightly increase their
mortgage and MBS portfolios through the end of 2009.195 However,
beginning in 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to annually
reduce their size by 10%.196
The government's plan was to "inject capital, guarantee home loans,
and buy up to $5 billion in mortgages in an attempt to stabilize the
companies .... ."197 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may also receive up to
$100 billion in capital from the Treasury to cover losses on mortgage
defaults in exchange for $1 billion in senior preferred stock with warrants
to purchase almost 80% of each company's stock.198 The plan involves the
use of warrants to avoid the inherent problem resulting from the fact that
the government is only authorized to purchase shares of the companies
through the end of 2009.'19 This plan allows the Treasury to inject capital
into the companies in order to keep them solvent simply by asking the
firms to increase the value of their shares rather than purchasing
additional shares.200
'9 12 U.S.C. S 1452 (1992), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-289 (2008); Ann M. Burkhart,
Symposium: A Festschrit in Honor of Dale A. Whitman: Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72
Mo. L. REv. 1031, 1044 (2007); Reiss, supra note 187, at 1054-55.
' See David Schmudde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory Landscape, 14
FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 765 (2009).
194 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, & 42 U.S.C.).
us See Russell Berman, Fannie, Freddie Takeover Meets with Skepticism, NEWYORK SUN, Sept. 8,
2008, at BU10. [hereinafter Berman, Takeover]. See generally WEISS, supra note 57, at 3-4 (containing
more information about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's mortgage portfolios).
19 Berman, Takeover, supra note 195.
'9 Id.
198 Id.; Maya Jackson Randall, U.S. News: U.S. Reafirms Backing OfFannie, Freddie Stock, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A5.
199 Randall, supra note 198, at A5.
2W Id.
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The goal of the government's takeover plan is to increase liquidity and
certainty in the mortgage markets by allowing market participants to know
what the future holds.201 While the takeover won't immediately stop
declining home prices, it may limit the magnitude of the declines to 5-
10% over the next year, rather than the additional 15-20% declines experts
projected would occur if the companies were allowed to fail. 20 2 However,
this intervention is not without significant cost. By one estimate, the
bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could end up costing each U.S.
taxpayer more than $16,000.203
D. Rating Agency Regulation
The RMBS derivative market depended heavily on the ratings of
ratings agencies to serve as a proxy for due diligence and testing for
economic soundness. 20 4 If the ratings agencies had not issued high ratings
for what we now know were securities of questionable risk, the market
would not have thrived.2 05 In essence the ratings drove the profits. Rating
agencies steadfastly maintain their role in the transaction is to assess
likelihood of repayment on time.206 To the contrary, market players
viewed ratings as a proxy for value.207 In response to this perceived lack of
rigor in the rating system, the SEC published new rules in February 2009
regulating certain activities of nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations ("NRSROs") .208 Generally speaking, the "new rules . . .
impose additional requirements on NRSROs to regulate or prohibit
certain conflicts of interest in the rating process, require specified rating
related information to be publicly disclosed and require other information
to be recorded and retained by NRSROs for use in Commission
examinations." 209
2 Randall Smith & Serena Ng, The Fannie-Freddie Takeover: Street Set to Fill Hole in Mortgage
Market, WALL ST.J., Sept. 8, 2008, at C2.
2 Michael Corkery, The Fannie-Freddie Takeor: Plan Skirts Housing's Bgest Troubles - Rescue Won't
Fix Falling HomePries, Rising Foratosures, WALL ST.J., Sept. 8,2008, atA14.
2 Burkhart, supra note 19Z at 1043.
2N See supra Part l.B.
205 See Matthews, supra note 37, at 245.
2' See Poindexter, supra note 44, at 543. See also Fitch Ratings: Know Your Risk,
httpVww.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/public/ratingsdefintionsinde.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
27 Poindexter, supra note 44, at 543 n.118 (explaining that "[a]bsent a complete portfolio due
diligence though, [ratings] are the closest thing an investor has to a plausible default proxy.").
2N See generally 17 C.F.R SS 210, 229,230,240,244,249 (2009).
M9 Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb on SEC Rating Agency Adoption Reproposal, 1 (Feb. 12,
2009), avadable at httpf/www.cgsh.conVfiles/New3b4c44ff-1 d80-4aa7-bfbc-2109a312d5eVPresentation/
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The new rules lift the veil that previously shrouded the process and
provides transparency to the transaction. 2 10 New requirements include:
* Adopting requirements that NRSROs disclose prescribed
ratings performance statistics for each class of securities they
rate;
* Adopting requirements that NRSROs disclose specific
information about their methodologies for determining and
maintaining ratings;
* Adopting requirements that NRSROs maintain internal
records of the full rating histories for each credit rating they
assign and make public the ratings histories for a 10%
sampling of their issuer-paid ratings;
* Proposing for comment an additional rule requiring NRSROs
to disclose rating histories for all of their issuer-paid credit
ratings with a 12-month lag;
* Adopting requirements that NRSROs maintain internal
records of material deviations in final structured finance
ratings from those implied by the NRSRO's quantitative
model;
* Adopting requirements that NRSROs maintain internal
records of third-party complaints against credit analysts;
* Adopting prohibitions on NRSROs making
'recommendations' to arrangers of structured finance
products they rate concerning how to obtain a desired rating;
* Adopting prohibitions on NRSRO personnel involved in the
credit rating process negotiating fees with arrangers or
receiving gifts from them ... .211
Furthermore, there is increased disclosure on performance already
rated and issued securities. Form NRSRO currently requires disclosure.
of procedures and methodologies used by NRSROs to assign credit
NesAttachment/1c75dd4-7e4c-4345-83e9-241d72fb573/SEC%20Rang 0/oAgency%20Adoption%2Rep
roposal%20 Alert%/20Memo.pdf
210 Id. at 7. It is worth noting that the proposed rule arguably was of the greatest significance to the
transparency of the rating process-public disclosure of information used to determine an issuer paid ratng-
was not adopted. Comments to the proposed new disclosure requirement raised problems with
confidentiality. See id at 10. The reproposal of this rule would make this type of disclosure a new type of
conflict of interest disclosure locked under a password protected website that can be accessed only to monitor
credit ratings. See id. at 9.
211 Id. at 2.
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ratings, and specifies several aspects of the ratings process that must be
described. The new rules add three additional areas of specific disclosure:
1) If the NRSRO relied on information of verification of performance of
assets underlying the structured product (and if so, how); 2) If
assessments of the underlying asset originators' quality are used to
determine ratings (and if so, how); and 3) How often are ratings reviewed
and the criteria employed.212
IV. FuTURE OF RMBS MARKET
Regulatory response to the problem has tended to be reactive as
opposed to proactive. On April 7, 2010, the SEC proposed significant
revisions that would radically change the regulation of the CDO
market.213  Chairman Mary Schapiro acknowledged that the proposed
changes "stem from lessons learned during the financial crisis."2 1 4 These
revisions address several crucial failings highlighted by the recent crisis
including (but not limited to): 1) lack of asset based information; 2)
disclosure of static pool information; 3) loss of faith in the rating agencies
to signal risk; 4) lack of continued investment by the sponsor in the
securitization offering (and the implications of a direct hedging
transaction); 5) lack of computational ability for investors to track cash
flow; and 6) Private Placement Safe Harbor disclosure information when
* - -215
securities are not subject to registration.
Although laudable in attempting to rectify past mistakes, this route
misses the mark. Indeed, the eulogy for the CDO market has been
written. 2 16 Regulating with an eye to the rearview mirror will produce
laws designed to hit a target whose time has come and gone. Financial
innovation results in a dynamic market that, through its nimbleness,
212 Id. at 4.
213 Asset-Backed Securities, Release Nos. 33-9117; 34-61858 (proposed Apr. 7, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, 249), available at
http//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9117.pdf.
214 Press Release, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase Investor Protections in Asset-Backed Securities
(Apr. 7,2010), available at httpVAww.sec.gov/newtpressl201(Y2010-54.htrn.
215 Several law firms have provided in depth analysis of the proposed rule changes. See SEC Proposes
Significant Revisions to Regulation AB and Other Rules Regarding Asset Backed Securities, Goodwin
Proctor, httpf/www.financialcrisisrecovery.conVp= 1101 (last visited Apr. 26, 2010); Posting of Tara Castillo
to Alston + Bird Financial Markets Blog, www.alston.con/financialmarketscrisisblog(?entry=3333 (Apr. 8,
2010,9:15 EST).
216 SeegeneralyJody Shenn, CDO Maet isAlmost FrozenJP Mogan, Mem71 Say, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Feb. 5, 2008, http/ww.bloombergacodapps/news?sid=aCkOQrlf2Eew&pid=20601087 (noting
"[d]emand for new CDOs has stalled...").
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results in regulatory and informational gaps. 217 On the other hand, the
residential mortgage market is more than a Wall Street playground. It
constitutes a bedrock of American values that no longer can be subject to
the "investment du jour" attitude of high stakes financial games. We
witnessed a dangerous liaison between greed and financial innovation that
was played out in the basements of America's homeowners.
In the spirit of exalting principles over rules in regulatory reform,218 I
propose to attempt to delineate the optimal balance of leeway for
innovation and low risk investment that results in an equilibrium of a
responsive, yet sound, housing finance market. Rather than picking out
individual regulatory goals, I would suggest that regulation of the
residential mortgage market should focus on interplay of three touch
points:
Equity v. Debt
Fee Income v. Public Policy v.
Long Term Investment Free Market
A. Equity v. Debt
In an usual delineation of debt versus equity, the discussion focuses
on optimal firm capitalization. Beginning with Modigliani and Miller and
through contemporary finance literature, much has been written about
the economics of debt versus equity decision making.219 However, in this
217 See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 98, at 431 (explaining that the potential for "disclosure gaps
and misunderstandings" grow with the increase of financial innovation).
218 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 163, at 749-59 (discussing rules versus principles).
219 See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN. REv. 261, 267-70 (1958). See e.g., Franklin Allen, The Changing
Nature ofDebt and Equity: A Financial Perspective, in ARE THE DIFFERENCES BE[WEEN EQUITY AND DEBT
DISAPPEARING?, CONFERENCE SERIES No. 33, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, 12-38 (Richard
W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1989); Paul Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An
Empirical Study, 37 J. FIN. 121 (1982).
2010] 175
176 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 18:143
discussion of the future of the RMBS market, the focus shines on how
equity and debt should be regulated-not optimized. The irony of the
situation is that the securities market is heavily weighted towards equity
regulation. What is not adequately regulated is the homeowner equity.
Unlike a more traditional approach to firm capital structure, the home
mortgage market requires both an examination of the effect of equity held
by the homeowner and the impact of debt held by third parties on that
homeowner equity. Regulation on one side necessarily affects regulation
on the other.
Much of the anecdotal information during the recent crisis centered
on how the financing opened up the market to homebuyers who then
operated way beyond their means. 22 0 It is no surprise that if the market of
available capital permits buyers to push loan to value ratios further and
further upward, the slightest downturn in the housing market will have
disastrous consequences. Although the policy of promoting
homeownership will be discussed, infra, it certainly bears mentioning here
that market discipline, through regulatory intervention, should be
imposed on the minimum amount of equity.2 2 1  Although some
commentators choose to assign fault with the lenders by categorizing
some loans as "predatory,"222 hurling labels obfuscates the issue: people
bought houses they could not afford. The first regulatory step should
include minimum loan to value ("LTV") maximum income/payment
ratios. High loan to value ratios (which must include both first and
second liens) have a strong positive association with the likelihood of
default.m It may be less important to regulate debt to income ratios
See generally Tara Siegel Bernard, With Eyes Bigger than Their Wallets, Homebuyers Are Forced
To Revisit Old Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.conV2009/03/21/your-
money/mortgages/21thirty.html?_r= 1 (discussing how homebuyers need to re-evaluate the
percentage of income they spend on housing).
221 Indeed in other scenarios limitations on loan to value ("LTV") have instilled market
discipline. For example after the commercial real estate market crashed in the early 1990s, LTV rates
plummeted. Poindexter, supra note 44, at 523-29, 531-36.
m Victimizing the Borrowers: Predatory Lending's Role in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, KNOWLEDGE
WHARTON, Feb. 20, 2008, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid= 1901. See also
Eliot Spitzer, Predatory Lenders' Partner in Crime, How the Bush Administration Stopped the States from
Stepping in to Help Consumers, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, available at httpV/www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/13/AR2008021302783.html.
M Amromin & Paulson, supra note 85, at 26. Stated another way, the value of the borrower's default
put option depends on the initial LTV. See Haughwout et al., supra note 85, at 249.
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("DTI"). Studies of the effect of higher DTI conclude that this ratio
only becomes significant in predicting default if above 50%.s
The other side of the equation addresses the somewhat unbalanced
approach of debt regulation (versus equity regulation). First line RMBS
offerings (and CMBS offerings) are regulated as equity securitizations. 6
In other words, the interests in the pool are offered in an equity offering.
The underlying pool for payment, however, is a debt pool. 2 I have
written in prior articles that, at least in the lower tranches, the investors
should approach this as equity investment.228 As such when these lower
tranches are spun off into "AAA" CDO tranches the debt side risk (non-
payment) evaporates as the equity interest emerges deceptively risk free.229
Through lack of transparency (because of lax regulatory reporting
requirements), a false dichotomy emerged between the riskiness of the
debt investments and the riskiness of derivative offerings. For example,
ERISA prevents certain institutions from engaging in risky investments.230
This prohibition takes the form of requiring a minimal rating from a
credit rating agency.2 ' However, through the "magic" of spinning and
tranching, a formerly ineligible investment becomes eligible.
To rectify this situation, regulatory reporting requirements must be
clear that real estate mortgages are the repayment source for any RMBS
investment (including the derivatives spun off). An investor that traces its
repayment stream back to the homeowner must be aware that the flow of
this stream will be immediately impacted by any slowdown in
homeowner repayments of the underlying mortgages. Looking back on
the interface between the investment market and the real estate market
immediately preceding the crisis, this seemingly obvious fact was not
always clear. Wall Street didn't comprehend Main Street and Main Street
didn't comprehend Wall Street. This clash of cultures resulted in a
mutual misunderstanding and massive regulatory holes. Investments,
2 The maximum income payment ratios are relevant because many homeowners got into
financial difficulty when their teaser rate loans reset into market interest rate amortizing loans.
225 Haughwout et al., supra note 85, at 254. In fact, DTI was found not to be significantly correlated
for prime loans. Amromin & Paulson, supra note 85, at 27.
22 See Poindexter, supra note 44, at 520-21.
227 Id.
Z28 Id.
22 See Forte, supra note 2, at 10.
2o See Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. S
1104(a)(1)(B)-(C) (1988).
231 Michael Barbanell Landres, Smoke, Mirrors, and ERISA: The False Illusion ofRetirement Income
Security, 40 LOY. LA L. REV. 1169, 1200 (2007).
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such as the derivatives discussed herein, drove a large arbitrage truck
through these gaps of understanding.
Regulation, therefore, must bring not only Main Street - traditional
real estate mortgages - in line with minimum LTV and debt service
coverage ratio ("DSCR"), but also it must address the other side of the
equation by forcing Wall Street - investment community - to model risk
based on likelihood of repayment of the underlying real estate debt.
B. Fee Income v. Long Term Investment
Whole mortgages are the epitome of long-term investment. To make
matters even worse, in residential lending they probably lack a call feature
and usually do not have automatic market based interest resets. Not
surprisingly, this lack of investment agility was a driving factor that led to
the buying, bundling and securitizing of mortgages. Investors in RMBS
securities can match investments with risk profile and investment horizon
quite divorced from the long slow pay of a 30-year mortgage. The recent
market upheaval, however, goes one step further. Investors were not
content with making money from the investments. The real money was
in the generation of fee income.
Fee income completely escaped regulation. Lenders who made loans
on Monday and sold them on Tuesday were not concerned that the
borrower stopped paying by Wednesday. The fee drove the deal; and the
fee was collected on Monday. The moral hazard in this scenario is widely
discussed. 2  The churn of mortgages caused lenders to disregard any
lending standards and practices.2 Fees, however, were not solely the
province of initial lenders. They were also a major driver in the
derivatives market. When AIG Financial underwrote a swap, the fees
were a massive source of income.234 In other words, AIG did not enter
the transaction as a traditional insurer, assessing risk by performing due
diligence on likelihood of loss. Rather, risk was dismissed in the name of
a quick fee. The frenzy to compete simply overwhelmed the process.235
232 See generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 183, 183 (2009) (asserting "the root cause of the Financial Crisis was systemic moral hazard.").
3 See Amromin & Paulson, supra note 85, at 21 ("[T]he typical borrower may have received less
scrutiny over time that it became easier for borrowers to get loans overall, as well as to get larger loans.").
2 Katie Benner, AIG Woes Could Swat Swap Markets, Sept. 17, 2008,
http;//money.cnn.conv2008/09/16/news/derivatives-benner.fortune/indexhtm ("AIG (AIG, Fortune
500) sold protection on nearly $600 billion of fixed income assets in the form of credit default swaps -
including $57.8 billion tied to subprime mortgages.").
235 See generally Forte, supra note 2.
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The thirst for the fee income blinded market participants, who focused
myopically on the derivative market and ignored the real estate market, to
the risk of the underlying mortgages.
Therefore, fee regulation on investment in the RMBS market must be
imposed. The secondary mortgage market system was supposed to instill
market discipline by smoothing loan consistency and homogeneity so as
to minimize the necessity of in depth due diligence on each pool. Instead,
attention to the underlying pool and the real estate risk it entailed were
simply completely ignored.2 6 This disregard occurred not because
investment was risk-free, but rather because the driving force of engaging
in the market was the generation of fee income, not investment income.
C. Public Policy v. Free Market
There are many theories of why, if and when markets should be
subject to regulation."7 Imposition of regulatory strictures constrains free
markets. In fact, deregulation was hailed as the bedrock of market self-
correction and efficiency.2 8 However, as a self-regulating industry under
the purview of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the
derivatives market is a miserable failure. As one commentator noted, "It is
obvious this self-regulating institution does not possess the discipline to
independently oversee the market. Allowing the derivatives market to
proceed in this manner is essentially equivalent to allowing investment
banks to self-regulate the securities industry."239
To make the mess of self-regulation of the derivatives market even
worse, at the same time the RMBS market was being ornamented with
derivatives, Washington signaled a strong push toward expanding and
broadening access to homeownership.240 However, as the number of high
quality borrowers naturally dried up, the secondary market fueled demand
236 Coffee & Sale, supra note 163, at 732 ("[U]nderwriters had become willing to buy
portfolios of mortgage loans for asset-backed securitizations without seriously investigating the
underlying collateral.").
2 A seminal article with an exhaustive discussion of this topic is Steven P. Croley, Theories of
Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1998).
23 Coffee & Sale, supra note 163, at 710-11.
23 Unterman, supra note 113, at 20.
24 See Information Statement, Fannie Mae (Apr. 1, 2002), available at
http/www.fanniemae.con/markets/debt/pdlinfostmtmar2002.pdf see also Mobilizing dre Private Seaor
America's Homawnership Chalenge, Homeownership Policy Book, available at httpf/georgewbush-
whitehousearhivesgovifocus/homeownership/homeownership-policy-book-ch2pdf
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for real estate loans.2 4 1 The resultant explosion opened up the market to
new, marginal quality, borrowers.2 4 2 Before long, our economy witnessed
the intersectional collision of the public policy of promoting
homeownership with the reality of the free market.
From tax preferences to special programs, homeownership has long
been a bedrock of U.S. public policy. Perhaps it is time to re-consider
whether everyone should be a homeowner. Leaving aside all of the
anecdotes of homeowner greed and living beyond means, pushing the
market beyond where people can reasonably function in a sound
economic fashion is a fraud on the market and a lie to the homeowner.
Even if the derivatives market is regulated, the primary mortgage market
must return to sound underwriting criteria that may close some marginal
borrowers out of the market. During the last market upturn, model
driven structuring and underwriting replaced human driven interaction
between borrower and lender.2 4 3  The result was people who did not
understand the financial obligations they undertook and a lender who had
no accountability for that lack of understanding.
The secondary mortgage market occupies a fundamental financial
foundation for home mortgage capital. As such, it must be treated with
protection from speculative and risky investments. Simply regulating out
specific investment vehicles, however, only begs for methods to innovate
around regulation. Focusing on maintaining transparency and linkage
between debt and equity risk and maintaining focus on long term
investment while solidifying the mortgage consumer profile are important
steps in securing the safety of this important market.
241 John Carney, How the Gommnment Caused the Mortgage Crisis, Bus. INSIDER, Oct. 16, 2009, available
at httpv/www.businessinsider.con/how-the-government-caused-the-mortgag-crisis-2009-10.
242 See Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, The Rainds Charade, BLOOMBERG.CoM (ul 2007),
http-w.bloomber/om -newmarkesmagsraing.htl (discussing ratings and subprime mortgages).
243 Richard Williams et al, The Changinrg Face of Inequality in Home Mortge Lending, 52 SOCIAL
PROBLEMs 181, 184 (2005).
